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KENTUCKY LAw JoURNAL
THE PROPOSED REFERENDUM AM ENDMENT
By C. B. SEY ouR*
There ds a growing fondness for direct legislation by the
voters, and a growing distrust of representative government.
There is also a growing restiveness at the exercise of the power
of the courts to declare statutes unconstitiutional, and a growing fear that the courts may thwart the will of the people. As
a remedy for the apprehended evils, it has been suggested that
whenever a Federal statute shall be declared unconstitutional,
a referendum of the question to the voters should be had. Another proposed remedy suggested is a provision that if a Federal statute shall be declared unconstitutional, there should be
a provision that in ease of the re-enactment of the statute by
Congress, it shall be a valid law.
The advocates of these remedies desire constitutional amendments providing these remedies.
The members of the bar generally deprecate such amendments as hurtful and injurious and destructive of the wise system of government under which we live; but there seem to have
been few articles (or none) published tending to show that it is
impossible for the Federal courts, (no matter what their wishes
may be) to thwart the will of the nation. The purpose of this
article .is to show that without any change in the Constitution,
the courts are powerless to thwart the fixed determination of
the people.
Ever since Lutkter v. Borden, 7 Howard 1, it has been recognized that there are questions political in their nature, and not
judicial. They must be determined by Congress and the President-not by the couxts. Whether or not the matter is political or judicial, has thus far been decided by the courts, not by
Congress; butshould Congress (with the President) docide that
a matter is political, not judicial, Congress (with the President)
has control of the entire force of the nation, including the public purse, and can enforce its will notwithstanding any determination of the courts to the contrary.
That statutes might be enacted which would give the courts
authority to pass on questions which are in their nature politi*Attorney at law, Louisville, Ky.
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cal, will be conceded by all, but Congress, which has power to
enact, has a like power to repeal.
The possession of a power is a widely different thing from
the exercise of that power. Article IV, section 4, of the Constitution of the United States provides that the United States shall
guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican form of
government. Daniel Webster is said to have called this provision the sleeping lion of the Constitution. It is a soverign
power. The exeroise of it has not been conferred by statutes on
the courts; should the courts against the will of Congress and
without statutory authority attempt to exercise this power,
Congress could and would disregard the action of the courts
and enforce its own will. While there is no probability that
the courts would make such an attempt, there is no need of a
constitutional amendment to hold them in check as to this.
Congress is not fettered 'by being compelled to transact the
public business within a few days. If the Constitution limited
a regular session of Congress to sixty days, a court sitting much
longer might ran over Congress; but Congress has the power
to continue in session and carry on its work up to the beginning
of another semion.
By Article III, Section 1, of the Federal Constitution, the
judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one
supreme court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may
from time to time ordain and establish. Hence any court inferior to the Supreme Court may be repealed out of existence.
When Thomas Jefferson succeeded John Adams as President of
the United States, it was deemed desirable -todo away with the
distriet courts, and to substitute new courts-circuit cogxts.
This was done. While Chief Justice Marshall was inclined to
treat as unconstitutional and void, the act of April 29th, 1802,
by which this was done, other justices of the Supreme Court
took the opposite view. The change stood; and now for one
hundred and twenty years there has been no doubt of the power
of Congress to do away with any Federal Court other than the
Supreme Court.
By Article III, Section 2, of the Federal Constitution the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is subject'to such
exceptions as the Congress may make, so that any portion of
that jurisdiction may be repealed.
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A notable instance of the exercise of this repealing power
is found in the Federal Statute enacted March 27, 1868. In
ex parte MeCardle, 6 Wall. 318, the Supreme Court ruled that
it had jurisdiction of an appeal in habeas corpus proceedings.
There was a fair probability that the exercise of this power
might open up the question of the validity of much of the reconstruction legislation; but the statute mentioned shut off the
-question, and was applied to the very ease-McOardle's case-in which the existence of the appellate jurisdiction had been
determined by the Supreme Court.
Two recent decisions of the Supreme Court have attracted
attention and have caused some restiveness. An examination
of those decisions will show that the law laid down by them
could be repealed by statute. Duplex Printing Press Co. v.
Deering, 254 U. S. 443, held that the provisions of the Clayton
Act of 1912 forbidding the issuing of injunctions and restraining orders in certain classes of eases, applies only between parties to a dispute concerning terms or conditions of employment.
The action of a U. S. Circuit Court in issuing an injunction as
to the recent railroad strike at the instance of the United States,
carries -out the doctrine of this decision. But it is apparent
that the decision is based on the construction of a certain statute; and that it does not question the power of' Congress to
enact a statute so worded as to forbid the injunction in cases
like the case in vhich it was rendered or in cases like the railroad strike case.
The case of the United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co.,
(decided in June, 1922) 'holdsthat an unincorporated labor union
may be sued, and its funds applied to satisfy a judgment against
it. A like decision was rendered by the House of Lords in Taff
Vale Railway Co. v. Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants,
(1901), A. C. 426-the House of Lords nevex overrules its own
decisions; but Parliament by a statute-the 4th section of the
Trade Disputes Act 1906-5 Edw. VII Ch. 47--repealed the law
so- declared. Congress hds clearly the right to repeal the law
of the American -ase, if Congress sees fit so to do.
There are four instances in which the Supreme Court has
declared a law that was contrary to the will of the nation. In
all these cases the will of the nation has prevailed; and no such
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constitutional provision as the one now suggested was necessary.
The first of these eases-Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dallas, 419held that a ,State might be sued in a civil, action in the Supreme
Court by a citizen of another State. The. eleventh amendment
to the Constitution was promptly adopted which excluded
cognizance of such suits from the judicial power of the United
States.
The second of these eases-Scott v. Sanford, 19 How. 393the famous Dred Scott case-had a much more serious sequel.
The point decided was that a negro is not a citizen; many other
propositions were set forth in the opinions in the ease. The
case was decided in March, 1857; on July 23, 1868, the fourteenth amendment was ratified which declares that "all persons
born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof -are citizens of the United States and of the
State in which they reside." This amendment repealed the law
stated in Scott v. Stafford. A civil war intervened between
the decision of the Supreme Court and the ratification of the
amendment. It is certain that an armed conflict would not have
been averted by a referendum.
The third case above xeferred to is Hepburn v. Griswold, 8
Wall. 603, which held the Legal Tender Acts unconstitutional
as to contracts made before -their enactment. Congress by statute increased -the number of judges of the Supreme Court. In
the Legal Tender cases, 12 Wall. 457, Hepburn v. Griswold was
overruled; the new judges voted in favor of overruling Hepburn v. Griswold, Knox v. Lee, Parker v. Davis, 12 Wall. 457.
The fourth case above referred to is Pollock v. Farmers'
Loan & Trust Co., 157 U. S. 429, relating to the -incometax. The
sixteenth amendment repealed xestrictions supposed to exist on
the power of -Congress to levy income taxes.
Since the adoption of the eighteenth amendment it is settled that it does not require a vote of two-thirds of the members of each House of Congress to propose an amendment; twothirds of a quoroum of each House may suffice.
It thus appears that without any change in our form of government, Congress and the. President-who xepresent the will
of the nation-have full power to prevent a thwarting of that
will by the courts; for--
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1. Congress has power to repeal out of existence any Fed-eral court except the Supreme Court;
2. Congress has power to ;repeal any portion of the.appellate jurisdiction of, the Supreme Court;
3. Congress -has power to increase the number of judges of
the Supreme Court; if it should do so, the President would have
power to nominate for the new judgeships men known to favor
the overruling of an objectionable decision, whether made in the
exercise of original or appellate jursdiction;
4. The difficulties in the way of the adoption of specific
amendments to the Federal Constitution are by no means insuperable.
It is not the purpose of this article to show that either the
proposed referendum amendment or the proposed amendment
that a re-enactment shall be final es (to constitutionality, would
be hurtful or injurious or destructive of the wise system of government under which we live. The scope of this article is to
show that both the proposed amendments are needless and useless.

